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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Legal Status of Injured Churchgoer
in Suit Against Bishop
The problem whether a churchgoer is an
"invitee" and may therefore recover from
his church for injuries negligently caused on
church property has received various inter-
pretations by the courts. In the recent
Florida case of McNulty v. Hurley,' plain-
tiff-churchgoer brought suit against her
Bishop for injuries suffered when she fell to
the ground after being pushed from behind
by a crowd while leaving church. The court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action, reasoning that a person
who attends a religious service does so for
his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit
and is at best a licensee to whom is owed the
duty only of refraining from wanton negli-
gence or wilful misconduct.
Courts have approached the legal status
of an injured churchgoer in three distinct
ways: 2
( 1) By making the doctrine of charitable
t 97 So. 2d 185 (1957).
2 An occupier of land must keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition for the invitee. Messner
v. Webb's City, Inc.,- Fla.-, 62 So.2d 66 (1952);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343, comment a (1934).
In the case of a licensee the occupier of land
is only required to refrain from wanton negli-
gence or wilful misconduct and to warn of any
defect, not ordinarily noticeable, of which he
knows. Any active operations must be carried on
with reasonable care for his protection. City of
Boca Raton v. Mattef, - Fla. -, 91 So.2d 644
(1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 77 (2d ed. 1955);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 342 (1934).
immunity applicable to religious societies
and churches.5
(2) By using the "economic benefit" test
which requires some benefit to pass to the
occupier from the entrant before the latter
can be classified as an "invitee."
(3) By applying the "invitation" test
which gives an entrant the status of "invitee"
even without a benefit to the occupier if an
invitation to enter can be found from the
nature and use of the premises.
Where the charitable immunity doctrine
has been applied to churches, the courts
have generally required a finding that the
plaintiff was a spiritual beneficiary of the
church before barring recovery 4 and some
courts have found a plaintiff to be a spiritual
beneficiary even where he was not a member
of the church.5 However, in recent years the
tendency has been away from the use of this
doctrine with the result that only ten states
grant complete immunity, 6 while eighteen
" Glaser v. Congregational Kehillath Israel, 263
Mass. 435, 161 N.E. 619 (1928); Bianchi v. South
Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 8 A.2d
567 (1939); Burgie v. Muench, 65 Ohio App.
176, 29 N.E. 2d 439 (1940).
4 Ibid. See also Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St.
194, 39 N.E. 2d 146 (1952). Other courts have
held spiritual benefit to be too difficult of deter-
mination to support charitable immunity. Foster
v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d
230 (1950).
5 Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church, note
3 supra; Burgie v. Muench, note 3 supra.
6 Complete Immunity:
Arkansas -Fordyce v. Women's Christian Nat'l
Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906).
See Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co.
v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (1940);
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states have a rule of partial immunity7 and
Arkansas Midland R.R. v. Pearson, 98 Ark. 339,
135 S.W. 917 (1911).
Kentucky - Averbach v. YMCA, 250 Ky. 34, 61
S.W. 2d 1066 (1933).
Maine - Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary,
107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910).
Maryland - Howard v. South Baltimore General
Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948).
Massachusetts -(Excepting torts committed in
the course of noncharitable activities). Roosen
v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66,
126 N.E. 392 (1920).
Missouri - Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo.
436, 196 S.W. 2d 615 (1946).
Oregon - Gregory v. Salem General Hospital,
175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944).
Pennsylvania - (Excepting torts committed in the
course of noncharitable activities). Bond v.
Pittsburg, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328 (1951 ).
South Carolina - Vermillion v. Woman's College,
104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
Wisconsin - (Excepting breach of a statutory
duty). Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160
N.W. 173 (1916).
Partial Immunity-This depends upon the victim's
status or the nature of the negligence charged or
both, or ability to levy against the charitable trust:
Colorado - An action may be brought against a
charitable institution, but a judgment cannot be
levied on any of its property which is part of
the charitable trust. O'Connor v. Boulder Colo-
rado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d
835 (1939).
Connecticut -Cohen v. General Hospital Soc'y,
113 Conn. 188, 154 AtI. 435 (1931).
Georgia - Robertson v. Executive Comm.. of Bap-
tist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S.E. 432
(1937).
Illinois - An action may be brought against a
charitable institution, but trust funds cannot be
taken to satisfy a judgment. Moore v. Moyle,
405 I11. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
Indiana - Old Folks & Orphan Children's Home
v. Roberts, 83 Ind. App. 546, 149 N.E. 188
(1925). See limitation in Winona Technical
Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393
(1909).
Louisiana- Bougon v. Volunteers of America,
151 So. 797 (La. App. 1934).
Michigan - Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal
Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
Nebraska- Sibilia v. Paxton Memorial Hospital,
121 Neb. 860, 238 N.W. 751 (1931). See limi-
.tation in Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital
twenty states no longer apply or have never
applied this doctrine.8
Ass'n, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208 (1918).
Nevada - Bruce v. YMCA, 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac.
798 (1929).
New Jersey - Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Epis-
copal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 Ati. 237
(1934). But see page 177 this Issue.
North Carolina-Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E. 971 (1910).
Ohio - Esposito v. Henry H. Stambaugh Audito-
rium Ass'n, Inc., 49 Ohio L. Abs. 507, 77 N.E.
2d 111 (1946).
Tennessee - An action may be brought against a
charitable institution, but judgment cannot be
executed against property used for charitable
purposes. McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170
Tenn. 423, 95 S.W. 2d 917 (1936).
Texas - St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164
S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
Virginia - Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131
Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921). See limitation in
Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va.
101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
Washington- Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical
Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P. 2d 128
(1955).
West Virginia - Roberts v. Ohio Valley General
Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
Wyoming - Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley,
24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
8 Total liability rejecting charitable immunity:
Arizona - Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72
Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
California - Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232
P. 2d 241 (1951).
Delaware - Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46
Del. 350, 83 A. 2d 753 (1951).
Iowa - Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n,
241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950).
Kansas - Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175
Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
Minnesota - Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakon-
niessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699
(1920).
New Hampshire - Welch v. Frisbie Memorial
Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939).
New York - Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 143
N.E. 2d 3 (1957).
North Dakota - Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W. 2d 247 (1946).
Rhode Island - Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital,
12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
Vermont - Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese,
116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
The legal definition of an invitee depends
upon whether the "invitation" test or the
"economic benefit" test is used. Under the
"invitation" test, the mere invitation of
the occupier, expressed or implied from his
conduct, or from the arrangement of the
premises, is sufficient to classify the entrant
an invitee. 9 Since no benefit to the occupier
is necessary under this theory, the church-
goer would appear to be an invitee.10 Thus,
for example, in a Missouri case'1 where the
plaintiff was knocked down and injured by
a crowd leaving church (as in the instant
case), the court held her to be an invitee.
This invitation has been declared by Okla-
Tend to reject charitable immunity:
Alabama - Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191
Ala. 572, 68,So. 4 (1915).
Florida - Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital,
• 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
Idaho - Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P. 2d 1041 (1956).
Mississippi - Mississippi Baptist Hospital v.
Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951),
afl'd, 56 So. 2d 709 (1952).
Oklahoma- Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla.
687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940). See also Sisters of
Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82
P. 2d 996 (1938).
Utah - Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645
(1938). See also Brigham Young University v.
Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 638 (1941).
States which have never passed on the doctrine:
Montana, New Mexico and South Dakota.
9 See St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Dooley, 77 Ark.
561, 92 S.W. 789 (1906); Guilford v. Yale Uni-
versity, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942);
Sulhoff v. Everett, 235 Iowa 396, 16 N.W. 2d 737
(1944).
10 Green v. Church of Immaculate Conception,
248 App. Div. 757, 288 N. Y. Supp. 769 (2d
Dep't 1936) (mem. opinion); Davis v. Central
Congregational Soc'y, 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am.
Rep. 368 (1880); Weigel v. Reintjes, 154 S.W.
2d 412 (Missouri 1941). See Fernquist v. San
Francisco Presbytery, 313 P. 2d 192 (Cal. 1957).
11 Weigel v. Reintjes, note 10 supra.
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homa to be limited to particular areas of the
church. 12
Under the "economic benefit" test, on
the other hand, the inference of an invitation
from the conduct of the occupier or from the
character of the building itself is not suffi-
cient. To acquire invitee status, some advan-
tage must be shown to result to the owner
or occupier because of the entrance. 13
The standard used in the present case is
the "economic benefit" test. In the view of
the court, "economic benefit" to the occu-
pier is necessary to create invitee status
rather than mere invitation based on the
arrangement of the premises. The court
admits that a church invites all to enter and
worship but since the benefit goes to the
entrant and hot to the church such an invi-
tation is not sufficient for the "economic
benefit" test. 14 The opinion states:
One of the concepts of all religious beliefs
known to us is that participation in religious
activities is for the benefit of the mortals
who participate therein .... The plaintiff in
this case .. .can [not] .. . in good faith,
contend that she went to mass for the benefit
of Jesus Christ or the defendant .... 15
12 ".... [F]rom the very nature of religious services
and functions . . . there usually exists an express
or implied invitation to all persons to enter church
premises, nevertheless, such an invitation . . . is
necessarily limited to such parts of the premises as
reasonably appear to have been designed, adapted
and prepared for the accommodation of such per-
sons .. " Keck v. Woodring, 201 Okl. 665, 201
P.2d 1133, 1135 (1948). See also Weiss v.Chevera
Sward Bussach Ahrih, 279 App. Div. 664, 107
N.Y.S.2d 895 (2d Dep't 1951) (mem. opinion).
13 Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 577 (1880);
Cowart v. Meeks, 131 Tex. 36, 111 S.W. 2d 1105
(1938); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332 (1934). A
person who is classified as a licensee under the
"economic benefit" test might very well be an
invitee under the "invitation" test.




Moreover, contributing to the church does
not, in the court's opinion, change the plain-
tiff's status as beneficiary because ". . . we
who give material things to assist in the work
of our chosen religious belief receive by so
doing."' 6 Since the benefit is to the plaintiff
and not to the church, she is a licensee
rather than an invitee and cannot recover
in the absence of wanton negligence or
wilful misconduct.
With the growing rejection of the doc-
trine of immunity of charitable organizations
from tort liability, 17 the question whether a
churchgoer is an invitee or licensee is likely
to receive greater consideration. Because of
the uncertainty presently existing as to lia-
bility in this area, it is submitted that pastors
provide protection against such possible
liability through adequate insurance. 18
Aliens and Sponsors'
Affidavits of Support
In the recent case of Department of
Mental Hygiene of the State of California
v. Renel,' an agency of the State of Califor-
nia sued defendants for expenses incurred
caring for an immigrant alien who had
become a public charge. The plaintiff con-
tended that an affidavit of support, given
16 Id. at 189.
17 See President and Dir. of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957);
Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24 N.J. 549,
133 A. 2d 12, 17 (1957) (dissenting opinion); 2
HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1667-68 (1956);
Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV.
312, 327-28 (1957).
18 Roman Catholics are required by Canon Law to
obtain permission from the Bishop before suing
the Catholic Church. See CODEX IURIS CANONICI,
Can. 120; cf. BOUSCAREN AND ELLIS, CANON LAW
A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 102 (3d rev. ed. 1957).
See also Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart,
supra note 17, at 16.
1 8 M.2d 615, 167 N.Y.S.2d 22 (City Ct. 1957).
by the defendants to assist the alien's
admission into the country, constituted a
contract with the United States, upon which
the state could sue as a third-party bene-
ficiary. The New York City Court dis-
missed the complaint on its merits holding
that the affiants assumed only a moral obli-
gation, which was legally unenforceable.
Aliens likely to become public charges
are denied admission to the United States.2
While this has been substantially the effect
of immigration laws enacted since 1882,-
no statutory provision has specified the
exact type of evidence an alien must submit
to show he is not a member of this excluded
class.
4
The initial determination of admissibility
is made by the local consular officer in the
country from which the alien seeks to emi-
grate, upon his application for a visa. In
the usual case, on the question of becom-
ing a public charge, the consular officer
requires evidence that the applicant has or
will have (1) sufficient funds in the United
States, or (2) adequate income-producing
2 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a) (15),
66 STAT. 183, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(15) (1952).
322 STAT. 214 (1882); 39 STAT. 874 (1917), as
amended, 43 STAT. 153 (1924), 66 STAT. 163, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
4 The immigrant must state: "... whether or not
he is a member of any class of individuals ex-
cluded from admission into the United States."
Immigration and Nationality Act § 222(a), 66
STAT. 193, 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (a) (1952). But see
Refugee Relief Act § 7(a), 67 STAT. 403 (1953),
50 U.S.C. § 1971e (Supp. IV, 1957), which pro-
vides: "... no visa shall be issued to any alien
under this Act unless an assurance [is given] . . .
that such alien, if admitted into the United States,
will be suitably employed without displacing some
other person from employment and that such
alien and the members of such alien's family who
shall accompany such alien . . . will not become
public charges. . . . Each assurance shall be a
personal obligation of the individual citizen or
citizens giving or submitting such assurance."
Ibid.
employment awaiting him, or (3) friends
and/or relatives assuring his support by
submission of an affidavit.5 No prescribed
form is used for this affidavit,, nor is there
usually an investigation of the affiants.7
Generally, the affiant's statement contains
information on resources, obligations and
arrangements made for the immigrant's
support.8
The Renel case appears to present the
first clear judicial holding on the legal unen-
forceability of the affiant's obligation. That
the affiant assumes only a moral obligation
has been acknowledged in prior decisions
by dictum or inference. 9
The fact that the statement signed by the
affiant reads like a contract is meaningless.
No administrative official could properly
impose contract liability on any person
signing such an agreement, unless such a
contract was within the purview of the
statute or enabling act, 10 through which the
governmental administrator derives his
authority.11 The evident lack of contractual
5 AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 174 (1955).
6 Id. at 175.
7 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 347
(1950).
8 AUERBACH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 175.
9 See, e.g., United States ex rel. De Sousa v. Day,
22 F.2d 472, 474 (2d Cir. 1927); United States
ex rel. Smith v. Curran, 12 F.2d 636, 638 (2d
Cir. 1926). The exclusion of people likely to be-
come public charges has been widely extended to
include among others: a minor whose father
would be liable for his support only during mi-
nority, Lam Fung Yen v. Frick, 233 Fed. 393
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 242"U.S. 642 (1916); one
whom it may be necessary to support at public
expense by reason of insanity, disease or idiocy.
Wallis v. United States ex rel. Mannara, 273 Fed.
509 (2d Cir. 1921).
10Immigration Act, 1917, 39 STAT. 874, as
amended, 43 STAT. 153 (1924).
11 GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65
(1954); see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
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intent on the part of the State Department
in exacting the affidavit of support sustains
the decision of the court.
If an enforceable legal obligation was
contemplated by the Immigration and Na-
turalization Act, it seems reasonable that the
statute would have prescribed well-defined
limitations concerning the amount of money
deemed necessary to have available, the
duration of time during which the agree-
ment would be in effect, and other pertinent
conditions. 12
A case with reasoning seemingly contra-
dictory to that of the instant case is Scimone
v. Weaver'3 decided subsequent to the Renel
case. There an alien was held bound by the
statement signed by her and her sponsor
that she would be housed without displacing
some other person. The alien came to live
with her sponsoring relatives in the lower
apartment of a two-family house owned by
them. A year and a half later, she purchased
a one-half interest therein, and sought to
oust the tenant in the upper apartment so
that she might herself occupy it. The court
denied her application for a certificate of
eviction citing her agreement not to displace
other persons.
However the two cases are readily distin-
guishable. Each party entered the country
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). But
see American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90 (1946); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944).
12 The fact that there exists a statute, whereby
the Attorney-General in his discretion may re-
quire the posting of a bond if it is felt that the
alien is likely to become a public charge (Immi-
gration and Nationality Act § 213, 66 STAT. 188,
8 U.S.C. § 1183 (1952)), would seem to indicate
that the legislature realized the inability of the
Act to prevent an alien from becoming a public
charge or to provide a legally enforceable remedy
therefor.
13- M.2d -, 169 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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under different immigration acts' 4 imposing
different obligations. Also, in the Scimone
case the alien herself signed a statement
agreeing to a prescribed course of conduct,' 5
whereas in the Renel case the sponsor alone
signed an affidavit guaranteeing certain obli-
gations in relation to the alien.
The holding of the court strictly enfor-
cing Scimone's agreement is more easily
understood when we consider that the act
under which she entered the country"6 was
an emergency measure designed to admit
refugees from Communist persecution, nat-
ural calamity, or military operation. 17 The
visas authorized under this act were special
non-quota visas apart from those regularly
issued under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act and this, coupled with the then
prevailing political atmosphere,' would
tend to explain the court's decision.
Although the Renel decision seems to be
a just one, it illustrates the difficulty encoun-
tered by consular officers in determining
whether an immigrant is "likely to become
a public charge." Aware of the legal inef-
ficacy of sponsors' affidavits, the Senate
14 Renel: Immigration Act, 1917, 39 STAT. 874,
as amended, 43 STAT. 153 (1924), Scimone:
Refugee Relief Act, 1953, 67 STAT. 400, as
amended, 68 STAT. 1044 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 1971 (1957).
15 Refugee Relef Act, 1953, 67 STAT. 403, as
amended, 68 STAT. 1044 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 1971(e) (1957).
16 Refugee Relief Act, 1953, 67 STAT. 400, as
amended, 68 STAT. 1044 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. § 1971 (1957).
17 AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 259 (1955).
18 The political atmosphere prevailing in 1953 was
one reflecting apprehension over inroads made by
subversive groups within the United States. Hos-
tilities in Korea had just recently subsided and
there were several legislative investigative bodies
active in government, e.g., McCarthy Committee,
Jenner Committee, Velde Committee, et al.
Judiciary Committee has recommended that
this. requirement be discontinued. 19 The
Committee has urged:
. . . where the admissibility of an alien is
questionable as one likely to become a pub-
lic charge, the consular officer . . . [should]
deny the issuance of a visa unless he is in
receipt of notice ... that a suitable bond or
other undertaking has been given which
provides a proper indemnity in case the
alien becomes a public charge after entry.20
Inasmuch as the initial determination
made by the consular officer as to the likeli-
hood of an alien becoming a public charge
is usually controlling in the matter, the
requirement of having a bond posted for
the alien will not, as the fear has been
expressed, greatly diminish the number of
aliens who might otherwise have been per-
mitted to immigrate. Those deemed not
likely to become public charges, if otherwise
qualified, are granted a visa; whereas those
deemed likely to become public charges are
denied visas. Therefore the problem relative
to the advisability of requiring an indemni-
fication bond arises only in those borderline
cases where it is questionable in which cate-
gory the alien should be placed.
Where a bond is posted for one in this
doubtful class, it will enhance his likelihood
of being granted a visa. It will not in any
way affect whether he does, in fact, become
a public charge, but clearly it will relieve
the state of the burden of support if he does.
On the other hand, those for whom no bond
is posted stand in identically the same posi-
tion they would have stood, had there been
no provision for a bond. To this extent the
posting of a bond will facilitate the granting
of visas to those who otherwise might not
qualify.
19S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 349
(1950).
20 Id. at 349-50.
